Dear Dame Marie Gabriel CBE, NEL ICB Chair, Zina Etheridge NEL ICB Chief Executive Officer,
Mr Shane DeGaris, Barts Health NHS Trust, Group chief executive, Matthew Trainer, Barking, Havering and Redbridge NHS CEO, and Bas Sadiq, Homerton Healthcare NHS FT CEO
We the undersigned NHS and social care employees and patients from across the North East London ICB region express our deep concern at the rollout of the Federated Data Platform (FDP), and the supplier of this technology, Palantir.
We note that North East London Integrated Care Board, Homerton Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Barking, and Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust are signed up to the NHS FDP (supplied by Palantir) and have not yet adopted it. Barts Health NHS Trust are live with the NHS FDP supplied by Palantir. We urge you to reject the adoption of the Federated Data Platform operated by Palantir as it poses a serious threat to NHS and trust values, undermines public health, medical ethics, patient trust, good data governance and fair procurement.
1. Palantir, the provider of the FDP, is likely complicit in human rights abuses, war crimes and genocide
Palantir is a US tech company which specialises in AI-powered military and surveillance technology and data analytics. Palantir describes its military technologies as offering customers “mission-tested capabilities, forged in the field” to deliver “a tactical edge – by land, air, sea and space”.
Palantir has a long history of using its technology to facilitate human rights abuses across the world. It supported the US government to track and deport migrants at the Mexico border, including in forcibly separating children from parents. It provides predictive policing services to the US police force, shown to disproportionately target Black communities. These actions violate the ethical principles on which our NHS is founded.
Palantir is currently supplying the Israeli military with “advanced technology provision” in support of genocide related missions. Palantir’s CEO Alex Karp says he is “exceedingly proud” of Palantir’s involvement in what he calls “operationally crucial operations in Israel” keeping Israel “armed and ahead”.
The most recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling regarding Palestine came in July 2024, with an Advisory Opinion that declared Israel’s occupation of Palestine unlawful under international law, specifically mentioning forcible transfer, racial discrimination and apartheid, and it called for Israel to withdraw immediately. The ICJ also laid out directions for the responsibility of states and international organisations and stated that failing to act was furthering ‘genocidal violence’. In relation to the ICJs case on genocide it said that if states didn’t cease their aid and assistance to Israel’s acts, they would be complicit, and this includes transfer and trade that contributes to Israel’s military. By supplying advanced AI technology to the Israeli military, it is likely that Palantir is complicit in war crimes and genocidal violence.
On 23 June 2025 the British Medical Association voted to resist the rollout of the FDP based on the view that Palantir was an unacceptable partner for the NHS.
With all of the above evidence, we trust you will agree that Palantir is an unacceptable partner for the NEL ICB and its individual trusts. Any part of the NHS associating with a company linked to civilian harm undermines public trust and will cause great reputational risk. It will also compromise our commitments as health workers to protecting, promoting and maintaining the health, safety and wellbeing of the public, and promoting and maintaining public confidence in the health professions.
2. There are serious concerns about the data privacy, data management, and data ethics of the FDP as supplied by Palantir.
Many leading medical and data ethics experts have voiced alarm at the supposed safeguards put in place to protect patient data within the FDP, including the BMA, who wrote to the government last year arguing: “The public and the profession have not been adequately consulted and reassured, and the scope and scale of the programme do not appear to have been sufficiently established.” The lack of trust over how patient data would be handled gave the BMA concerns that it would fatally undermine the project.
The NHS has sought to reassure patients that their data will be safe because it is “pseudonymised” or “anonymised” but the level of detail in a health record means such data can never be truly confidential, with a small number of data points being enough to reveal the identity of the patient. Furthermore, pseudonymisation is designed to be reversible, and is still regarded as personal data by the Information Commissioner.
These weak reassurances, along with the lack of clarity around the applicability or otherwise of the national data opt-outs to the FDP mean that there are persistent fears over the data privacy protocols to be implemented by the NHS, Palantir and others involved in the project.
There is a dangerous track record of data being shared across government departments to target vulnerable communities including migrants and refugees, including NHS patient data. Campaigners are rightly alarmed that the FDP will make this even easier. Despite claiming that Palantir would not have access to “identifiable medical records”, NHS documents obtained by openDemocracy admitted that the company will “collect and process confidential patient information”. Legitimate concerns over the way NHS patients’ data will be used within the FDP are exacerbated by the multiple inconsistencies and gaps in information communicated to the public about the way data will be held, for what purpose, and with what safeguards over its use.
Palantir has supported the US spy-agency NSA and UK spy-agency GCHQ in software for mass surveillance of populations, and was linked with Cambridge Analytica in its operations to collect data on Facebook users and interfere in the Brexit referendum.
With all of the above evidence, we trust the ICB realises the threat to data privacy this contract presents, and the potential follow-on damage to patient trust in all health data systems.
3. We have serious concerns about the privatisation and outsourcing of health data management systems to corporations.
We have serious concerns that such an important NHS function as data management systems is being outsourced to a private company. Locking the NHS into a single monopoly supplier holds severe risks that senior leaders should be mindful of, especially when Palantir themselves have stated its intention to monopolise government contracts with its technology. Palantir’s software cannot be transferred to another company or back onto NHS systems easily. This means that the whole of NHSE’s integrated data system will be stuck on Palantir’s systems or will need to be rebuilt from scratch. This exact issue played out when the NYPD tried to end its use of Palantir’s technology. This is neither democratic or competitive, and will result in one private provider dominating the data management systems of the NHS.
During the COVID-19 pandemic Palantir were handed access to the NHS for just £1, in a contract that was awarded without competitive tender. Concerns about the procurement process have since been widely aired.
The Chief Data and Analytical Officer’s Network have also raised numerous concerns. One is the risk to the NHS of potential reliance on proprietary products and AI tools developed by Palantir, particularly if these are inaccessible to local analysts or lack transparency, contrary to the principles of the Goldacre Review. A second significant risk is that of very large potential maintenance costs falling on individual trusts.
We trust the ICB agrees that this raises serious concerns of the risk to vital NHS resources.
Despite the £8 million from the Department of Health that has been handed to KPMG to “promote the adoption” of Palantir’s software across the NHS it is important to note that several trusts are rejecting Palantir’s FDP.
It is not too late for the ICB to refuse to adopt Palantir’s FDP and its products.
Our requests to the ICB are as follows:
- Do not implement the FDP locally and/or pause any existing rollout plans
- Raise these concerns nationally and oppose the enforced rollout on all trusts
- Publicly and clearly communicate the ICB position on the FDP
- Explain whether – and how – patients can opt out of including their data in the FDP